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Think of the liability system as a poker game. Each person,
corporation, or other entity in the economy is a player. Players risk
their chips, that is, their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, that
is, investing them in liability-generating economic activity. Chips
contributed to the pot are at risk of loss; the system can take them
to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk.
This poker game has an odd twist to it. Withholding chips does
not reduce significantly the amounts players can win nor players'
likelihood of winning. Even players who don't put any chips in the
pot-that is, players who are judgment proof-can keep playing the
game and are eligible to win.
Why do players put chips in the pot? No rule requires them to do
so. There are social, cultural, and economic pressures. But
mostly, they do so for convenience. A wealthy player who wants
that wealth available for use, but not in the pot to be lost through
liability, must build arcane legal structures and document them
through extensive record keeping.
In recent years, computer technology has dramatically reduced
the cost of record generation and, consequently, the cost of keeping
chips out of the pot. Major players are reducing their stakes. By
doing so, they are breaking down the social norms and cultural
barriers that prevent further reductions. The process is feeding on
itself. Soon no one will have significant chips in the pot. When
that happens the fundamental nature of the game will change.
Liability will die. 1

J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., University of
Connecticut. Mr. Henzy is a shareholder at Reid and Riege, P.C., in Hartford,
Connecticut, and concentrates his practice on business reorganizations and
workouts and bankruptcy and commercial litigation.
1.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1996).

739

740

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

VoL 32:739

I. INTRODUCTION

The use of offshore asset protection trusts to "keep chips out
of the pot" has exploded in the last decade. In 1994, one
commentator estimated that approximately $1 trillion was held in
offshore trusts. 2 Less than five years later, Britain's Home
Secretary Jack Straw estimated in a recent unpublished report
that $6 trillion is now held in offshore trusts.3 The Home
Secretary report estimated that this is as much as a third of the
wealth of the world's most affluent people. 4 An estimated five to
ten percent of the $6 trillion, up to $600 billion, is held in the tiny
British offshore islands of the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey and
Sark.5 There are an estimated 100,000 offshore trust companies
6
in the British offshore islands.
The use of offshore asset protection trusts is no longer
limited to the ultra-rich. Offshore trusts are marketed in financial
magazines and on the internet to people whose net worth is in the

hundreds of thousands of dollars. Setting up an offshore trust is
not cheap. Attorneys specializing in offshore trusts typically
charge as much as $18,500 to set up a trust and several
thousand dollars each year for maintenance of the trust.7
However, if a person owns several million, or even several
hundred thousand, dollars of assets and has trouble with
creditors on the horizon, this may be a relatively small price to
pay to put assets out of the reach of creditors.
Recently, Alaska and Delaware have enacted trust laws that
purport to provide some of the same type of protections against
the claims of creditors that are found in the laws of offshore
jurisdictions.8 These domestic asset protection trusts may have
several advantages over offshore trusts. First of all, they are
cheaper: it may cost only $6,000 to $12,000 to set up an Alaska

2.
See William J. Zink, Assets of Foreign Grantor Trust Not Includible in
Grantor'sU.S. GrossEstate, TAX ADVISOR, Feb. 1994, at 84.
3.
See David Leigh, Billions Hidden Offshore; Jersey Faces Tax
Clampdown, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 26, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File.
4.
See id.
5.
See id.
6.
See id.
7.
See Debra Baker, Island Castaway, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 55, 59.
8.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 3570-76 (Supp. 1998).
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trust.9 In addition, settlors may feel that their assets are safer in
a U.S. trust than they would be in a foreign trust.1 0
Asset protection trusts and asset protection trust laws are
designed to protect a person's assets from the claims of his
creditors. It is virtually impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction
over an offshore trustee. Further, the typical offshore jurisdiction
does not recognize foreign judgments."
Thus, a fraudulent
conveyance action in a United States court against an offshore
trustee offers little or no hope for recovery.
Offshore jurisdictions have either short statutes of limitation
on fraudulent conveyance actions or, as in the case of Belize, no
fraudulent conveyance statute at all. The Cook Islands trust law
provides that a fraudulent conveyance action must be brought
within two years of the time a claim accrues and within one year
of the time assets are transferred to a trust. 12 The practical effect
of these short limitation periods is that by the time a creditor
finds out where the money is and files an action, the statute of
limitations has run, thereby barring a suit. Even where a
fraudulent conveyance action is available, the plaintiff-creditor
carries a heavy burden of proof. For example, the Cook Islands
law requires a creditor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the settlor of a trust had an actual intent to defraud the creditor
bringing the action and that the transfer rendered the settlor
insolvent.1s Under the Cayman Islands law, a creditor must
prove that the settlor transferred property with fraudulent intent
14
and for inadequate consideration.
The laws of asset protection jurisdictions provide that selfsettled trusts are valid, i.e., that assets in these trusts are not
subject to the claims of creditors because the trust was selfsettled. For example, section 12(4) of the Belize Trust Act of 1992
provides that "[a]ny rule of law or public policy which prevents a
settlor from establishing a protective or a spendthrift trust of

9.
See Brad Burg, Is This The Best Asset-Protection Method Ever? MED.
ECON., Feb. 23, 1998, at 106, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
10.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing:A Rejoinder, 107 YALE

L.J. 1413, 1415 (1998) ("Americans can now judgment-proof themselves without
transferring their money and the titles to their properties to strangers offshore.").
11.
See International Trust Act, § 13D (1996) (Cook Is.) reprinted in 1
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS at C0I 122-23 (Walter H. Diamond &
Dorothy B. Diamond eds. 1999).
12.
See id. § 13B(3), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS,
supra note 11, at CKI 120-21.
13.
See id. § 13B(1), reprintedin 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS,
supranote 11, at CI 120.
14.
See Fraudulent Dispositions Law § 4(1) (1989) (Cayman Is.), reprinted
in 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND ANALYSIS, supranote 11, at CAY 137.
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which he is a beneficiary is hereby abolished."15 In 1997, section
34.40.110 of the Alaska statutes was amended to allow settlors to
create spendthrift trusts.1 6
Typically, asset protection trust laws provide that the settlor
may specify that the courts of the asset protection jurisdiction
have exclusive jurisdiction over the trust property and that the
laws of the asset protection jurisdiction are applicable to interpret
and determine the validity of the trust. For example, section
13.36.035 of the Alaska statutes provides that a settlor may
choose Alaska law;1 7 that the settlor's choice of Alaska law will be
valid as long as, inter alia, (a) some or all of the trust assets are
deposited in Alaska and are being administered by a "qualified
person" (i.e., an Alaska resident, an Alaska trust company, an
Alaska state bank, or a national bank with its principal place of
business in Alaska), (b) the trustee is a qualified person who is
designated as a trustee under the governing instrument or by a
court having jurisdiction over the trust, and (c) part or all of the
trust administration occurs in Alaska, including physically
maintaining trust records in Alaska;1 8 that Alaska courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over trusts that contain a valid Alaska
choice of law clause; 19 and that Alaska law be applied to
determine the validity, construction and administration of Alaska
trusts. 20
Obviously, asset protection trusts create problems for
individual creditors. The August 3, 1998, issue of Business Week

includes an article about Donald and Joanna Hess.21

Two

months before filing for divorce, Donald Hess allegedly
transferred ninety-two percent of the stock in Hess Holdings,
which is estimated to be worth over $200 million, to an offshore
trust in Gibraltar. 22 Despite the $600,000 Joanna Hess has
spent in legal fees, she has failed in her attempts to assert a
23
claim on the assets.
Asset protection trusts also create fundamental problems for
our society. Professor Lynn LoPucki stated the problem succinctly
in a 1996 Yale Law Journalarticle:

15.
Trusts Act § 12(4) (1992) (Belize), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL TRUST
LAWS AND ANALYSIS, supranote 11, at BEL 113.
16.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998).
17.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035 (Lexis 1998).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.

20.

Id.

21.
See William C. Symonds, Salting it Away in Margaritavlle, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 3, 1998, at 61.
22.
See id.
23.
See id.
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Law is a system for controlling human behavior. In contemporary
society, governments enforce law by essentially two mechanisms:
incarceration and liability. These roughly correspond to the two
spheres of the legal system: the criminal and the civil. In the criminal
sphere, the wrongdoer is threatened with imprisonment; in the civil
sphere, the wrongdoer is threatened with deprivation of wealth.
Liability is crucial because it is one of only two principal means by
which governments enforce law.
The liability system enforces liability through the entry and
forcible collection of judgments for the payment of money. Although
liability is most closely associated with products liability and other
tort actions, money judgments are also the means for enforcing
contracts, civil rights, labor and employment law, environmental
regulations, federal tax law, intellectual property law, most kinds of
property rights, and just about every other kind of law on the
books. Without liability, the American legal system would be
radically different.

The system by which money judgments are enforced is beginning
to fail. The immediate cause is the deployment of legal structures
that render potential defendants judgment proof. 24

Professor LoPucki recognizes offshore trusts as one of the leading
25
judgment proofing legal strategies.
As the use of asset protection trusts grows, governments will
respond. An orderly system of liability is too important to society
to allow vast amounts of wealth to be placed out of the reach of
creditors. However, to date, governments have not taken action.
Individual creditors are left to pursue their remedies in both
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy forums.
Faced with an increasing number of debtors who have
transferred assets to asset protection trusts, judges, in particular
bankruptcy judges, will have a difficult time accepting that
creditors are without a remedy while a debtor retains an interest
in substantial assets. This Article discusses several issues a
court may face in addressing this problem and three recent cases
on offshore trusts. The focus of this Article is on a debtor in a
bankruptcy case. In part, this is because the few cases on this
subject have been brought in bankruptcy courts. In addition,
from a creditor's perspective there are advantages in pursuing
assets in a protective trust in a bankruptcy court, such as the
bankruptcy court's nationwide jurisdiction over persons and
worldwide jurisdiction over property of the bankruptcy estate.
Many of the arguments should be applicable in state courts as
well.

LoPucki, supranote 1, at 3-4.
See id.
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II. THE CODE
How does the Bankruptcy Code treat spendthrift trusts?
Under the Code, "[t]he nature and extent of the debtor's interest
in property is determined by applicable non-bankruptcy law.
Whether that interest is included in the property of the debtor's
estate is determined by bankruptcy law."26 Bankruptcy Code
section 541(a)(1) provides that property of a bankruptcy estate
includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case."2 7
Thus, "[u]nder
paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal
or equitable interest of the debtor in property, wherever located,
as of the commencement of the case. The scope of this paragraph
is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or
28
intangible property... ."

Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) provides: "A restriction on
the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title."29 Subsection (c)(2) "preserves restrictions
on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is
enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law."3 0 Thus, under
subsection (c)(2), if applicable nonbankruptcy law provides that the
assets of a trust are protected from the claims of a debtorbeneficiary's creditors, i.e., that the trust is a valid spendthrift or
other protective trust, the assets of such trust may not be property
of a bankruptcy estate and may be excepted from the reach of Code
section 541(a)(1). However, if under applicable nonbankruptcy law
the assets of a trust are subject to the claims of a debtorbeneficiary's creditors, i.e., the trust is not a valid spendthrift or
other protective trust, the assets of such trust are property of the
31
bankruptcy estate.

26.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re
Prudential Lines, Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
27.
1i U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
28.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978).
29.
ii U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
30.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 369 (1977). See also S. REP. No. 95-989, at
83 (1978).

31.

See, e.g., In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361, 364-65 (Bankr. D. Me.

1995), affid, 195 B.R. 543 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that debtor-settlor-beneficiary's
interest in income and principal of trust included in bankruptcy estate where
anti-alienation provisions of trust were not enforceable under Maine law); In re

Baldwin, 142 B.R. 210, 214-15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that assets of
trust of which debtor was beneficiary were property of the bankruptcy estate
where trust not a valid spendthrift trust under Ohio law).
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The critical question in the context of asset protection trusts
is what is the applicable nonbankruptcy law?

III. JURISDICTION

Before reaching the choice of law issue, a bankruptcy court
must determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide whether
property held in an asset protection trust is property of a
bankruptcy estate. As noted, asset protection trust agreements
and the laws of asset protection jurisdictions typically include a
provision stating that the courts of the chosen asset protection
jurisdiction have exclusive jurisdiction over the assets in a trust.
In addition, it will be difficult or impossible for a U.S. court to
obtain personal jurisdiction over an offshore trustee. How does a
bankruptcy court enter orders with respect to the property in a
trust in the face of such trust provisions and laws?
28 U.S.C. section 1334(e) provides: "The district court in
which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and
of property of the estate."3 2 As the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated, "[i]t is well established that a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor's
estate, wherever located."33 "[L]egislative history makes clear
Congress' intent that 'wherever located' language be broadly4
construed to include property located in and outside of the U.S."3

Thus, if the property transferred to an asset protection trust is
32.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994).
33.
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988).
34.
In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (emphasis
added). See also In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 191 B.R. 935, 936 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1995) (holding that bankruptcy court had in rem jurisdiction over chapter 11
debtor's properties, wherever located, even though debtor was operator of
merchant fleet whose operation extended worldwide); Coan v. Bernier (In re
Bernier), 176 B.R. 976, 984 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) ("[Ilt is observed that the
district court, of which this court is a unit, ... has exclusive jurisdiction over all
property of the bankruptcy estate, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) ... ."); In re Comstock
Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 B.R. 849, 855 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) ("Through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(d), Congress has placed exclusive jurisdiction over property of bankruptcy
estates in United States District Courts. Congress has authorized district courts
to refer this in rem jurisdiction, as well as the subject matter jurisdiction granted
by Congress in 28 U.S.C. 1334(a), to United States Bankruptcy Courts."); Deak &
Co. v. I. R.M.P. Soedjono (In re Deak & Co.), 63 B.R. 422, 427-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (finding that shares of stock owned or controlled by debtor were property of
estate providing bankruptcy court with in rem jurisdiction in adversary proceeding
to declare stock pledge a voidable preference, notwithstanding that shares were
located beyond the borders of the United States).
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property of a bankruptcy estate, federal law provides that the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over such property.
In

addition, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine
whether the property transferred to an asset protection trust is

property of a bankruptcy estate.3, The bankruptcy court will
have personal jurisdiction over any domestic trustee.3 6 Further,
in order to enter a judgment that the property transferred to an
asset protection trust is property of a bankruptcy estate, the
bankruptcy court does not need in personam jurisdiction over an
offshore trustee.3 7
35.

See, e.g., Ebel v. Ebel (In re Ebel), 144 B.R. 510, 514 (D. Colo. 1992)

("As of the date of the filing of the petition, the bankruptcy court had absolute
authority and jurisdiction to determine what property belonged to the estate
itself."); Walsh v. Pennsylvania (In re Kingsley), 181 B.R. 225, 233 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1995) ("We unquestionably have jurisdiction to determine what property is
property of this bankruptcy estate and to direct turnover if bankruptcy property is
withheld."); DiBerto v. The Meadows at Madbury, Inc. (In re DiBerto), 171 B.R.
461, 475 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) ([T]he Court clearly has jurisdiction to determine
what is and what is not property of the estate."); In re Duval County Ranch Co.,
167 B.R. 848, 849 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) ("Whenever there is a dispute regarding
whether property is property of the bankruptcy estate, exclusive jurisdiction is in
the bankruptcy court."); Cole Taylor v. Ratner (In re Ratner), 146 B.R. 211, 214-15
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) ("[T]he bankruptcy court always has jurisdiction to
determine what is, or is not, property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §

541.").
36.
See, e.g., FED. R. BANxR. P. 7004(d), 7004(e); Diamond Mortgage Corp.
v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990); American Freight Sys. v. W.A.
Walker Assocs., (In re American Freight Sys., Inc.), 153 B.R. 316, 321 (D. Kan.
1993) (stating that "minimum contacts with the forum state are unnecessary"
when service is made under a federal service provision); General Am.
Communications Corp. v. Landsell (In re General Am. Communications Corp.), 130
B.R. 136, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The ' minimum contact test,' applied to a State and
a defendant, has no relevance here because... § 1334 provides us with 'federal
question' jurisdiction."); Hirsch v. Vlerbaum (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 163 B.R.
431, 433 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (MThe defendant admits that he is a resident of
Ohio. Therefore, there can be no question that the defendant has sufficient
contacts with the United States for a federal court constitutionally to exercise
personal jurisdiction over him."); Teitelbaum v. Choquette & Co. (In re Outlet Dep't
Stores), 82 B.R. 694, 699 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[I]n federal question cases,
where nationwide service of process is permitted, the 'minimum contacts' test set
forth in InternationalShoe does not apply.").
37.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1998). The Bankruptcy Court in O'Brien stated that:
Our in rem jurisdiction over property of the debtor and the estate
empowers us
to determine[ ] all claims that anyone, whether named in the action
or not, has to the property or thing in question. The proceeding is
one 'against the world.' The practical effect of such an action is to
establish an unquestionable title to the property because no one
can later claim exemption from the effect of the judgment on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.
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A bankruptcy court clearly has in rem jurisdiction to make a
determination whether property held in an asset protection trust
is property of a bankruptcy estate. If a bankruptcy court
determines that property held in an asset protection trust is
property of a bankruptcy estate, it has jurisdiction over that
property, irrespective of whether it has in personamjurisdiction
over the trustee.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES

As noted above, in the asset protection trust context the
critical question is: what is the applicable nonbankruptcy law?
With an asset protection trust, there are usually two possibilities
as to the applicable nonbankruptcy law under Code section
541(c)(2). Either the law of the home state of the settlor or the
law of the asset protection trust jurisdiction applies to determine
the validity of the trust.
All states in the United States recognize, to one degree or
another, trust provisions protecting trust assets or income from
the claims of creditors. Approximately one-half of the states have
enacted some type of spendthrift legislation, and courts in all of
the remaining states, other than New Hampshire, enforce
spendthrift provisions under common law principles.3 8 However,
"[t]here is .
. one universally accepted exception to the
spendthrift trust doctrine: state courts and federal bankruptcy
courts will not enforce a spendthrift provision in a self-settled
trust."3 9 Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 156 states the
general rule followed in most U.S. jurisdictions:

Id (quoting 16 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 108-106 (3d
ed. 1997)). See also, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Care Travel Co. (In re Pan Am
Corp.), 166 B.R. 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Tamposi v. FDIC (In re Tamposi Family
Inv. Properties), 159 B.R. 631, 637 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993); Whitlock v. Worrall (In re
Am. Aluminum Window Corp.), 15 B.R. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) ("[T]he
recovery of a preference requires an in rem jurisdiction over the property of the
estate and not necessarily an in personam jurisdiction over the Defendant.. .).
38.
See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your
Cake and EatingIt Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 29 (1994).
39.
Id. at 29-30. See also Robbins v. Webster (In re Robbins), 826 F.2d
293, 295 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The general rule is stated in Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 156(2) (1957). The creditors of a settlor may reach the assets of a
spendthrift trust to the maximum extent that the trustee might apply them for the
use and benefit of the settlors."); In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361,363-64 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1995), afrd, 195 B.R. 543 (D. Me. 1996) ("The principles that determine
the unenforceability of transfer restrictions on a self-settled spendthrift trust are
axiomatic."); Parkinson v. Brandford Trust Co. (In re OBrien), 50 B.R. 67, 75-76
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Virginia law); In re Berndt, 34 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1983) (Indiana law); Jensen v. Hall (In re Hall), 22 B.R. 942, 944 (Bankr. M.D.

748

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:739

(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a
provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his
interest, his... creditors can reach his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or
a discretionary trust, his . . . creditors can reach the maximum
amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to
him or apply for his benefit.4 0

As noted above, offshore jurisdictions, Alaska, and Delaware all
protect self-settled spendthrift trusts. Thus, if the law of the
asset protection jurisdiction applies, the assets in the trust will

be protected, i.e., the spendthrift provision of a self-settled trust
will be found valid. If the law of the settlor's home state applies,

the assets will be subject to the claims of creditors and will be
property of a bankruptcy estate or otherwise available to satisfy
the claims of creditors, i.e., the spendthrift provision of a selfsettled trust may be found invalid.
As an initial matter, there are two possibilities as to the
choice of law rule to apply. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals

has described the two possibilities as follows:
Federal Courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are required by
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941), to apply the choice-of-law doctrines of the forum state.
Many bankruptcy courts have read Klaxon as imposing the forum
state's choice-of-law rule on bankruptcy adjudications where the
underlying rights and obligations are defined by state law. In
contrast, federal principles should guide our consideration of which
jurisdiction's substantive law applies in cases arising out of federal
law. This is especially appropriate when a case involves
41
controversies implicating important federal bankruptcy policy.

There is a strong argument that the question of whether
property transferred to an asset protection trust is property of a
bankruptcy estate raises a federal question, so that federal choice
of law rules govern the choice of substantive law. A proceeding to
determine what constitutes property of the estate pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code section 541 is a core proceeding under 28
U.S.C. section 157(b)(2)(A) and (E).42 A proceeding is a core

Fla. 1982) ("It is uniformly held that when a spendthrift trust is created in which
part or all of the beneficial interest is reserved in the creator of the trust, the
restraint [on alienation] is invalid and the creditors of the creator may reach his
interest."); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 B.R. 305, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1982), affd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (Iowa law); Greenwich Trust Co. v.
Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 170-73 (Conn. 1942) (Connecticut law).
40.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
41.
Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs. (In re Koreag,
Controle et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
865 (1992) (citations omitted).
42.
See, e.g., In re Becker, 136 B.R. 113, 116-17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992);
Rodeck v. Olszewski (In re Olszewski), 124 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991)
("The portion of the proceeding over which the court has jurisdiction involves a
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proceeding if it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or
if it is a proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the
context of a bankruptcy case. 4 3 Further, while the extent of a
debtor's interest in property is determined by applicable
nonbankruptcy law, it is well established that whether property is
property of a bankruptcy estate is a question of federal law. 4 4
Core proceedings, including actions to determine whether
property is property of a bankruptcy estate, raise federal
questions of law and federal common law choice of law rules
45
should apply.
"Ihe federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law
of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation."4 6
In applying this greatest or "most significant" interest approach,
federal courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 47 Even assuming federal common law choice of law rules are
not applicable, the choice of law rule in most states, including New

determination of whether certain assets are assets of debtor's bankruptcy estate
and is, therefore, a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).").
43.
See, e.g., Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild and Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72
F.3d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1996).
44.
See, e.g., Marrs-Winn Co. v. Giberson Elec., Inc. (In re Marrs-Winn Co.),
103 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The question of whether a debtor's interest in
property is 'property of the estate' is a federal question to be decided by federal
law."); Ralar Distribs., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc. (In re Ralar Distribs., Inc.), 4 F.3d
62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993) ("What constitutes 'property,' within the meaning of
Bankruptcy Code § 541, is a question of federal law ...
."); Southtrust Bank v.
Thomas, 883 F.2d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 1989) ("'[W]hether an interest of the debtors
is property Of the estate is a federal question." (quoting In re DePoy, 29 B.R. 466,

469 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983)); Amdura Nal Distrib. Co. v. Amdura Corp. (In re
Amdura Corp.), 167 B.R. 640, 644 (D. Colo. 1994) ("[IThe extent to which a
debtor's interest in property creates 'property of the estate' for turnover purposes
is a question of federal law.") (citations omitted); In re Becker, 136 B.R. at 116
("IT]he question of what constitutes property of a bankruptcy estate is ultimately a
federal question.") (citations omitted).
45.
See, e.g., Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. RG Fin., Ltd. (In re
Powerburst Corp.), 154 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) ("As core
proceedings in bankruptcy are federal questions, this Court finds and holds that
the federal common law choice of law rules apply in this instance.").
46.
In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 350.
47.
See, e.g., Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 12 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("In the absence of Congressional guidance, we have from time to time
consulted the [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs] (1971) in fashioning
that federal rule."); Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777,
782 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Federal common law follows the approach of the
[RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS] (19171])."), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1018 (1994); In re Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 908 F. Supp. 400, 411 (N.D. Miss.
1995) ("Federal conflicts of law rules are those of the [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFUcT OF LAws].").
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York and Connecticut, is now the Restatement's "most significant
48
interest" test.

Under the most significant interest test, a designation in a
trust which provides that a certain law be applied to interpret the
trust is generally respected.4 9 "For the most part, it is immaterial
whether the forum designated for purposes of construing the trust
provisions has any connection with the creation or the
administration of the trust."5 0 However, "for purposes of
determining the validity of a trust, the settlor has 'not as free a
hand.' 5 1
The chief purpose in making decisions as to the applicable law is to
carry out the intention of the creator of the trust in the disposal of
his property. It is important that his intention, to the extent to which it
can be ascertained,should not be defeated, unless this is requiredby
the policy of a state which has such an interest in defeating his
intention, as to the particularissue involved, that its local law should
52
be applied.

As to a trust's validity, the Restatement provides:
An inter vivos trust of interests in movables is valid if valid
(a) under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to
govern the validity of the trust, provided that this state has a
substantial relation to the trust and that the application of its law
does not violate a strong public policy of the state with which, as to
the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant relationship
under the principles stated in § 6 .... 53

48.
See, e.g., Valley Juice Ltd. v. Evian Waters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604,
609 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In applying contractual choice of law provisions, Connecticut
courts routinely refer to the Restatement for guidance.") (citations omitted);
Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-49 (D. Conn. 1987)
(finding that the Connecticut choice of law rule in a case involving contract, tort
and fraud claims is the Restatement's most significant interest test), affd, 829
F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1987); Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R.
685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("New York law.., provides that 'the law of the
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied ...
(citations omitted).
49.
See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697; 5A AUSTIN W. ScoTr & WILLIAM F.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 575, at 201 (4th ed. 1987).

50.
In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697.
51.
Id. (quoting SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 49, § 575, at 201-02).
52.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 267 (1971))
(emphasis added). See also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 49, § 553, at 110-11
("In the making of a contract, the conflicting interests of two or more parties are
involved, whereas in the creation of a trust the intention of the settlor or testator
is the only important consideration, except insofar as some public policy may
defeat his intention.").
53.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 270. Section 6(2) of the
Restatement provides:
When there is no such [statutory] directive [on choice of law], the factors
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
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For example, when determining the validity of a trust, the local law
of the designated state will not be applied if this would violate a
strong public policy of the state with which, as to the matter in
issue, the trust has its most significant relationship. For example,
where the settlor creates a revocable trust in a state other than
that of his domicil, in order to avoid the application of the local law
of his domicil giving his surviving spouse a forced share of his
estate, it may be held that the local law of his domicil is applicable,
even though he has designated as controlling the local law of the
54
state in which the trust is created and administered.
In many cases, the asset protection trust's most significant
relationship will be with the home state of the settlor. The asset
protection jurisdiction will have a relationship to the asset
protection trust in that the trust will have been settled in the
asset protection jurisdiction, residents of the asset protection
jurisdiction will have been appointed as trustees of the trust, and
the trust is to be administered in the asset protection

jurisdiction. However, the debtor, who typically is both the settlor
and, during his life the beneficiary of the trust, the majority of the
debtor's creditors, and the majority of the beneficiaries of the
trusts upon the death of the debtor, are often residents of the
debtor's home state or at least of the United States. Typically, the
debtor's creditors will have no contacts with the asset protection
jurisdiction, and the debtor will have had the greatest contact
with the home state at the time he settled the trust. In these
circumstances, the home jurisdiction has the weightier concern
in determining whether or not whatever rights the debtor retained
after the formation of the trust could be considered to constitute
a property interest.
Where an asset protection trust is self-settled, application of
the law of the asset protection jurisdiction would offend strong
state and federal bankruptcy policies. As noted, Alaska and
Delaware notwithstanding, state courts and federal bankruptcy
courts will not enforce a spendthrift provision in a self-settled
trust. For example, under Connecticut law, it is against public
policy to permit a settlor-beneficiary to tie up his property in such
a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from

(a) the
(b) the
(c) the
interests

needs of the interstate and international systems,
relevant policies of the forum,
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(I) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
54.

See id. § 270, cmt. b.
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In Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, the Connecticut

Supreme Court stated:
The attempt of a man to place his property in trust for his own
benefit under limitations similar to those which characterize a
spendthrift trust is a departure from the underlying basis for the
creation of such trusts. That aside, the public policy which sustains
such trusts when created for the benefit of another is, where the
settlor is himself the beneficiary, overborne by other
considerations. In Johnson v. Connecticut Bank, 21 Conn. 148,
159, where we were considering the right of the creditor of a
beneficiary of a trust to secure satisfaction from the latter's right to
the income, we stated: "It is the policy of our law, that all the
property of a debtor should be responsible for his debts. And his
equitable estate may be taken, as well as his legal, provided it is
subject to his control"; and, subject to definite limitations, that has
always been the policy of our law. To admit the validity of such
trusts would open too wide an opportunity for a man to evade his
just debts to be permissible unless sanctioned by statutory
enactment. This is the reason why the overwhelming weight of
56
authority holds ineffective attempts to establish them.

There is a second basis upon which to apply the law of the
settlor's home state.
Under normal circumstances, contracting parties are free to
stipulate what state's or nation's law will govern their contractual
rights and duties, provided that the state or nation has a
reasonable relationship with the transaction, and the law chosen
does not violate a fundamental public policy of the forum state.
Nonetheless, the parties' stipulation will not be regarded where it
would operate to the detriment of strangers to the agreement, such
as creditors or lienholders. Where the rights of third parties are
implicated, the court should be governed by the ordinary rule that
the federal district courts apply the choice of law rules of the state
in which they sit. 5 7

55.
See Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 171 (Conn. 1942); In re
Tisdale, 112 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) ('The Connecticut Supreme
Court, in Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 219, 27 A.2d 166,171
(1942), ruled that public policy denied the validity of a trust where a person
placed 'his property in trust for his own benefit under limitations similar to those
which characterize a spendthrift trust.' This holding is in accordance with
prevailing law throughout the United States.").
56.
Greenwich Trust Co., 27 A.2d at 171 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
57.
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F.
Supp. 133, 139-40 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Exec Tech Partners v. Resolution
Trust Corp. (In re Exec Tech Partners), 107 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 1997) ("A
contract generally binds no one except the parties."); In re Kokomo Times Publ'g
and Printing Corp., 301 F. Supp. 529, 536 (S.D. Ind. 1968) ("IT]he parties could
not by agreement make Illinois law bind creditors and purchasers who were not
parties to the agreement."); Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201
B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ferrari v. Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re
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Thus, a debtor "may not unilaterally remove the characterization
of property as his simply by incorporating a favorable choice of
law provision into a self-settled trust of which he is the . . .
beneficiary. Equity would not countenance such a practice."5 8
The scope of a settlor's choice of law should be limited to
issues relating to the internal affairs of the trust. Neither the
settlor nor the trustee should be able to bind third party creditors
who are not parties to the trust agreement.
V. DOMEsTIc ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS

AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

If a bankruptcy trustee or a creditor obtains a judgment from a
bankruptcy court that assets in a domestic asset protection trust
are assets of the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy trustee or
creditor should be able to pursue effective remedies against the
trust trustee, including a turnover action under Bankruptcy Code
section 542.- 9 As noted above, the bankruptcy court will have
personal jurisdiction over the domestic trust trustee, so that a
judgment determining that property is property of a bankruptcy
estate and a judgment ordering turnover of such property would be
binding on the trust trustee. Further, the bankruptcy trustee or
creditor should be able to enforce any such judgment in the courts
of the asset protection trust jurisdiction. The enforceability of a
Bankruptcy Code sections 541 or 542 judgment and the

Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 384, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) modified, 148 B.R. 97
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). The FerrariCourt stated that:
The choice-of-law clause carries little weight in the context of this
adversary proceeding. The parties to a contract can specify which forum's
law will govern their contract, and courts often follow their choice because
both parties to the contract, and therefore to the suit on the contract, have
agreed upon the choice. But this is a fraudulent conveyance action, not a
contract action. And one of the parties to this suit-the Trustee, who
stands in the shoes of the creditors-was not a party to the contract. The
parties to a contractual conveyance cannot in their contract make a
choice-of-law that binds creditors who allege that they were defrauded by
the conveyance. The choice-of-law binds only parties to the contract, not
the Trustee or the creditors.
Id.
58.
59.

In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 701.
Bankruptcy Code section 542(a) provides in relevant part:

[Ain entity... in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of
property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this
title ... shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the
value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or
benefit to the estate.
...

11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994).
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enforcement of such a judgment in the courts of the domestic asset
protection jurisdiction would not be prevented by and, indeed,
would be supported by principles of full faith and credit.
"Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws
(legislative measures and common law) and to judgments."60 The
"Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply
another State's [statutory] law in violation of its own legitimate
public policy."61
[I]n the case of statutes, the extrastate effect of which Congress has
not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision, we
think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit
clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute,
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of
another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the
courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same
62
persons and events.

The Supreme Court has concluded that "Full faith and credit
does not here enable one state to legislate for the other or to
project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from
prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it."6 3
However, the full faith and credit obligation is more exacting
in the case of judgments.
A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons

governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the
land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in
other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide
64
force.

While "a court may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy'
in determining the law applicable to a controversy . . . [the
Supreme Court's] decisions support no roving 'public policy
exception' to the full faith and credit clause."6 5 Thus, absent
fraud or lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, the courts
of a state must recognize a judgment from a state or federal court
in another state, even if such judgment is not consistent with
local policy or law.

60.
61.
62.
(1939).
63.

Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663 (1998).
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 466, 502

Id at 504-05.
Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663-64.
65.
Id. at 664. See also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (stating
that the Full Faith and Credit clause "ordered submission . . . even to hostile
policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation
of the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it.").

64.
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As noted, in the case of a domestic asset protection trust, the
bankruptcy court will have personal jurisdiction over the trust
trustee. Absent fraud, full faith and credit would mandate that a
bankruptcy court judgment, finding a trust invalid pursuant to
the law of the forum state, would be enforceable in the asset.
protection jurisdiction, even though the trust would be valid
under the law of the asset protection jurisdiction.
VI. PORTNOY,BROOKS, AND LAWRENCE

Three recent cases address the validity of offshore trusts. The
first, Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy),6 6 involved one
Larry Portnoy, who was the president and sole shareholder of a
company named Mary Drawers. 6 7 In March 1987, Portnoy gave
Marine Midland Bank a guarantee of any existing and future
indebtedness of Mary Drawers to Marine Midland. 68 In March
1988, Marine Midland loaned $1 million to Mary Drawers. 6 9
70
In June 1989, Portnoy knew Mary Drawers was in trouble.
In August 1989, Portnoy established a trust in Jersey, Channel
Islands, naming himself as principal beneficiary and his two
children as additional beneficiaries. 7 ' The trust agreement
provided that the trust would be governed by Jersey law and
purported to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the trust's
interpretation in Jersey courts. 72 Portnoy retained substantial
control over the trust assets. 7 3 The Jersey trustee had no office,
telephone listing, or employees in the United States. 74 Over
several months following the establishment of the trust, Portnoy
75
transferred assets worth approximately $700,000 to the trust.
76
He
In November 1995, Portnoy filed a chapter 7 petition.
77
schedules.
his
in
trusts
the
in
held
property
the
list
not
did
Marine Midland filed an action under, inter alia, Bankruptcy Code
section 727 seeking to deny Portnoy his discharge, alleging that
Portnoy had intentionally or recklessly omitted from his

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See id. at 688-89.
See id.at 689.
See id.
See id.

71.

See id.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id
See I.L
See id.
See id. at 690.
See i& at 691.
See ii.
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schedules his interest in the property transferred to the trust.78
Portnoy filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging, inter alia,
that the assets transferred to the trusts were no longer his
that he was not
property at the time the petition was filed, 7so
9
obligated to list the property in his schedules.
The court found that it had jurisdiction to determine whether
the assets transferred to the Jersey trust were property of the
estate.8 0 Turning to the issue of whether Portnoy had a property
interest in the trust, the court noted that while property interests
are created and defined by state law, it is federal bankruptcy law
which determines the "outer boundary" of what may constitute
property of the estate pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section
541.81 The court found that it did not have to determine whether
federal or New York choice of law principles should be used to
determine the applicable local law, as both provide that the law of
the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation will
be applied.8 2 The court stated that while both federal and New
York choice of law principles respect a designation in a trust
which provides that a certain law be applied to interpret the
trust, a settlor is not as free to designate the law to be applied for
purposes of determining the validity of a trust.8 3 The court,
quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 270,
found that a trust is valid if considered so "under the local law of
the state designated by the settlor to govern the validity of the
trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the
trust and the application of its law does not violate a strong

78.

See id. at 688. Bankruptcy Code section 727(a) provides in part:

The court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with the custody of property under this title,
has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated or concealed, or has
permitted to by transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the
case-

(A)made a false oath or account ....
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994).
79.
80.
81.

See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 692.

82.

See id. at 697.

83.

See id.

See id. at 696.
See id.
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public policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue,
the trust has its most significant relationship..."84

The court found that because Portnoy, Portnoy's creditors,
and the other beneficiaries of the trust were all United States
domiciliaries, Portnoy's creditors had no contacts with Jersey,
and Portnoy had the greatest contact with the United States at
the time he settled the trust, New York had the most significant
relationship with the litigation.8" In concluding that self-settled
trusts are not valid under New York law, the court stated that
it probably goes without saying that it would offend our policies to
permit a debtor to shield from creditors all of his assets because

ownership is technically held in a self-settled trust, where the
settlor/beneficiary nonetheless retains control over the assets and
may effectively direct disposition of those assets ....
In the United States, it has long been held that "Jilt is against

public policy to permit the owner of property to create for his own
benefit an interest in that property that cannot be reached by his
creditors." ....
On the other hand, it is not at all clear what the policy behind the
86
Jersey [law] is except, perhaps, to augment business.

The court also found that Portnoy could not bind creditors
with the choice of law provision in the trust agreement. 87 The
court stated that "the only person that is a party to this choice of
law provision is Portnoy himselfY8 8 The court concluded that the
property transferred to the trusts was property of the bankruptcy
estate and for that, and other reasons, denied the motion for
summary judgment. 8 9
The second recent offshore trust case, Sattin v. Brooks (In re
Brooks),90 involved a debtor who owned stock in a number of
Connecticut corporations. 9 1 The corporations owned real estate
In the
and community newspapers located in Connecticut.
spring and summer of 1990, the debtor transferred his stock to
his wife. 9 2 His wife then transferred the stock to offshore trusts
located in Jersey, Channel Islands, and Bermuda. 9 3 The Jersey
and Bermuda trust agreements included choice of law provisions
designating Jersey and Bermuda law as the applicable law for

84.
(1971)).
85.
86.

Id. at 697-98 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 270
See it. at 698.
Id. at 700 (quoting 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 49, § 156, at 168).

87.

See id. at 701.

88.

Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 703.
217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Corn. 1998).
See id. at 101.
See id.
See id.
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interpreting the trusts. 9 4 Each trust agreement named the
debtor as the sole income beneficiary and permitted the
distribution to the debtor of as much of the principal of each
trust as each trustee deemed "necessary, advisable or appropriate
for his health, comfort, support, and for his needs in connection
with any enterprise in which he may be engaged either personally
or as an investor (without any duty to take into account other

resources of [the debtor]) .... "95
The court stated that the parties agreed that Connecticut's
choice of law rules were applicable for determining the applicable
nonbankruptcy law. 96 The court found that
Connecticut courts generally "respect the expressed will of the
settlor [of a trust] as to the controlling law." There are, however,
exceptions. Connecticut courts have held that "the legality of the

trust of personalty [is determined] by the law of the settlor's
. . ." Moreover, Connecticut will not "enforce the law of
another jurisdiction nor the rights arising thereunder, which ...
contravene [Connecticut] public policy."
Here, because stock
certificates are personalty, the settlor resides in Connecticut, and
on the basis of public policy considerations..., the enforceability
of the spendthrift provisions of the trusts is determined under
97
Connecticut law.
domicil.

The court held that the debtor was the settlor of the trusts. 98 The
court found that "[a] trust which names the settlor as a
beneficiary is invalid to the extent of the settlor's beneficial
interest ....
Those principals have been adopted in nearly every
jurisdiction." 99 The court went on to quote comment (e) to
section 156(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
Where by the terms of the trust a trustee is to pay the settlor or
apply for his benefit as much of the income or principal as the
trustee may in his discretion determine, his transferee or creditors
can reach the maximum amount which the trustee could pay to
him or apply for his benefit. 100

The court found that the spendthrift provisions of the trusts were
not enforceable under Connecticut law. 10 ' The court concluded

94.
See id.
95.
Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8 (Mar.
20,1997), In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98).

96.

See id.

97.
98.
99.

Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
See id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

100.

cmt. e (1971)).
101.

See id.

156(2)
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that the stock transferred to the offshore trusts was property of
the bankruptcy estate.1° 2

In the third case, Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence),
without much legal discussion the court adopted the reasoning of
Portnoy and Brooks in finding that the debtor's rights and
obligations under a Mauritian trust were governed by Florida and
federal bankruptcy law and that the property transferred to the
03
trusts by the debtor was property of the bankruptcy estate.'
This finding came in the court's order granting discovery
sanctions to the chapter 7 trustee-plaintiff in a Code section 727
action. 10
The decision is interesting because of the apparent
ease with which the court adopted the reasoning of Portnoy and
Brooks and because of the recitation of facts and the comments
made by the court.
Prior to October 19, 1987 (i.e., "Black Monday"), Mr.
Lawrence was a successful options trader and had utilized Bear,
Stearns & Co., Inc., as his trade clearinghouse.1 0 5 Following the
October 19, 1987, crash, the debtor and his companies
experienced a margin deficit with Bear, Stearns.1 0 6 On March 15,
1991, an arbitrator found that the debtor and certain of his
trading companies owed Bear, Steams in excess of $20
million.10 7 On April 7, 1993, a corrected final judgment in favor of
Bear, Steams against the debtor and certain of his trading
companies was entered by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in the amount of $20,412, 115.108
On or about January 8, 1991, just sixty-six days prior to the
arbitration award against the debtor, the debtor established a
trust in Jersey, Channel Islands.' 0 9 On February 7, 1991, thirtyseven days prior to the arbitration award, the debtor moved the
trust to Mauritius and amended the trust agreement to add
specific spendthrift trust language." 0
At trial on the trustee's motion to compel answers to

discovery, the debtor repeatedly testified that the trust was set up
for estate planning and retirement security purposes. 1
The
debtor refused to acknowledge that shielding his assets from his

102.
See id.
103.
Lawrence v. Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 917-18 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1998).
104.
See id. at 918.
105.
Seeid.at 911.
106.
See id.
107.
See id.
108.
See id. at 911-12.
109.
See &L at 912.
110.
See id.
111.
See id.
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creditors was an important aspect of the arrangement.1 1 2 The
court found this testimony to be "absurd, given the fact that
absent this shielding effort, there would be no money left for his
retirement as creditors would have taken every penny they could

find." 11 3 The debtor testified that the pendency of the arbitration
with Bear, Steams played no role in his decision to transfer
assets to the trust.1 14 The court again had a hard time accepting
the debtor's testimony:
Whether one characterizes the motive as "retirement security" or
not, placing assets this far from the reach of creditors inherently
evidences a singular intention. The purpose of the trust was
clearly to shield the Debtor's assets from a creditor which the
Debtor feared was about to obtain a staggering $20 Million
arbitration award against him. The timing of the trust's creation is
further evidence of this intent. 1 15

As a discovery sanction, the court ordered that the facts alleged
in the trustee's complaint, including those regarding the debtor's
interest in the Mauritian trust, were deemed to be established. 11 6
The court also stated that it believed that the debtor had perjured
himself during the evidentiary hearing and that it intended to
for further
make a reference to the United States Attorney
117
investigation in connection with this finding.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Portnoy, Brooks, and Lawrence cases demonstrate that
under the right facts and circumstances, courts can and will
enter orders finding spendthrift provisions of asset protection
trusts invalid. These cases and this Article discuss a path that a
bankruptcy court may follow to find that property transferred to
an asset protection trust is property of a bankruptcy estate.

Such a finding may lead to effective remedies for creditors, such
as denial of a discharge to a debtor, orders compelling a debtor to
direct a trust trustee to transfer assets, with contempt orders if
the debtor fails to comply, and, possibly, a claim against a
professional who assisted a debtor in setting up the asset
protection trust. In cases involving domestic trusts, because the
bankruptcy court will have personal jurisdiction over the trustee,
any judgment entered by a bankruptcy court would be binding on
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115.
116.
117.
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See id at 917.
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the trustee and a bankruptcy trustee or a creditor should be able
to pursue remedies against the trust trustee. In cases involving
offshore trusts, such as In re Brooks and the Hess article
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, where an asset such as
stock of a domestic corporation is at issue, a court may be able to
order the cancellation of stock transferred to a trust and the
issuance of stock to a creditor or a bankruptcy trustee. However,
unless and until governments take legislative action to prevent
transfer of assets to asset protection trusts, creditors will not
have completely effective remedies against a debtor who transfers
assets to an offshore asset protection trust.
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